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1. Introduction 
This review is requesting views on the quality and effectiveness of the audit of local 
authorities in England. Local Authorities deliver public services and are required to act in the 
public interest. Public audit inter alia. is intended to allow users of local authorities accounts 
to hold local authorities to account for their use of public resources. 
This contribution is presented in two parts. 
The first part provides an explanation of the perspective that the author has adopted to 
evaluating changes or proposed changes to performance management regimes and their 
public assurance arrangements in the public services in England, and elsewhere, over the 
last 20 years. This perspective informs the general comments or strategic views on the 
current arrangements for external audit and suggestions for their improvement that follow.  
The second part provides more specific responses to the specific questions that are 
summarised at the end of the individual chapters.   
 
2. Public Assurance, External Audit and the context in England.  
In order to determine whether current arrangements might be developed or improved it is 
necessary to identify the current purpose and role that public audit plays in the English 
context and to appreciate its strategic positioning in the inter-dependent and interrelated 
strategic and operational organisational landscape of public services in England. 
Dewar and Funnel (2017) have articulated the history of British audit and Campbell-Smith 
(2008) has provided insight into the role and expansion of the former Audit Commission, 
which was central to the arrangements prior to the current regime. Grace and colleagues 
(2012) also provide a helpful commentary on the purpose and roles of public audit, as well 
as some of the inadequacies of the arrangements in place up to 2012.  
However, the current arrangements, like the previous arrangements, need to be evaluated 
both holistically as well as in detail. They therefore need to be seen as part of the 
arrangements that collectively comprise the performance management regime for public 
services in England (Murphy 2019a).  
Figures 1 and 2 provide a simple generic model that has been developed to help 
understand, evaluate and/or comment on various public sector performance regimes (or in 
some cases ‘national frameworks’), and/or proposed changes to them, both in part and/or 
as a whole. It is a dynamic model as all of its elements are subject to potential changes over 
time. It is equally applicable to Local Authorities, as it is to healthcare, the police or the fire 
and rescue services. Various regulators, inspectorates and academics have requested 
briefings on its’ content and application in the past, when considering changes to their 
respective regimes (Murphy 2015, Murphy and Greenhalgh 2016, Murphy and Lakoma 
2018, 2019, Murphy et al. 2018). 
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The model has been used with an ‘evaluative lens’ that has been developed from the 
current legislative requirements of public services in England.     
Performance regimes (Talbot et al. 2005, 2008) for individual public services or for sectors of 
the public services have become increasingly popular with successive governments in the 
UK since the mid 1990’s. Successive central administrations have periodically introduced 
‘national frameworks’ or public service reforms for individual services or sectors (ODPM 
2004), which Talbot (Talbot et al 2005, Talbot 2008, 2010) and Martin et al (2016) have 
characterised as performance or improvement ‘regimes’ in the academic literature.  
These regimes attempted to consolidate and set out, sometimes in a single document, the 
government’s policy and objectives, the responsibilities, roles and expectations of delivery 
agencies and the monitoring, regulation and public assurance arrangements expected from 
the relevant organisations in the community of interest or practice.   
Murphy and Lakoma (2019 p2.) define performance regimes as:-  
“The context, the parameters, the agencies and the interrelationships operating 
within the three domains of policy development, service delivery and public 
assurance in public services or sectors”.  
 
Figure 1 above illustrates the overall model. As can be seen from this diagram the model has 
three levels. 
• The ‘principles’ or values that underpin public service. 
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• The situational or contextual constraints within which a particular service or set 
of services operates; and  
• The constituent policy development, service delivery and public assurance 
arrangements that operate in the service or sector. 
The key touchstone and underpinning assumptions for any public service framework is the 
public interest and the values and/or principles that are enshrined within public service.  
In the UK, this is currently relatively simple to identify since anyone who works as a public 
office-holder or a direct or indirect employee of the public sector in the UK should adhere to 
the seven principles of public life known as the 'Nolan principles' (Committee on Standards 
in Public Life 1995). These cover selflessness, integrity, objectivity, accountability, openness, 
honesty and leadership and are shown in Figure 1 as the large outer circle.   
In addition to these principles and values, there are situational or contextual constraints 
that act as the strategic parameters to the development of service frameworks and other 
policy/service/assurance regimes.  
Most national policy documents and frameworks attempt to cover these situational issues 
at the start of the documents as they ‘set the scene’ for any proposals that follow in the 
main body of the policy or framework. They generally include the legislative basis that 
provides the authority and legitimacy for the proposals; the current or revised strategic and 
operational organisational landscape that the service operates within; and the resource 
envelope deemed to be available and the timescales (short, medium and long-term) that 
the framework is expected to cover. These three key contextual constraints or parameters 
are shown as collectively comprising the second (inner) circle on Figure 1.  
Although the three key contextual constraints in the inner circle interact, influence and can 
affect each other, they also provide the medium term parameters for the three conceptual 
areas illustrated by the Venn diagram at the centre of the model, namely policy 
development, service delivery and public assurance.  
If performance regimes or frameworks are to be comprehensive they need to be cognisant 
of and make provision for the three interconnected ‘domains’ mentioned above. These 
three domains do not exist in isolation and their interactions are an important part of 
performance regimes. The domains are shown at the conceptual core of Figure 1. They are: 
• The policy or policy development domain – which determines the objectives of any 
policy, whether national, regional or local; but also identifies what the parameters to 
its development are and whether delivery is feasible and realistic 
• The service delivery domain - which determines how the service is to be delivered 
and ideally how its delivery is to be optimised, continually improved, sustained, 
innovated and constructively monitored; and  
• The public assurance or regulatory domain which shows how the public is to be 
provided with re-assurance that the money taken from them to finance the policy 
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prescriptions and the strategic and operational delivery of the service, is justified and 
provides value for money.  
Joined-up policy development, policy making and its ’implementation, is particularly 
important in public services that have mutually inter-dependent responsibilities to the 
public at national, regional and local community levels. Efficient and effective service 
delivery is also equally interdependent at local, regional and national levels; and the 
objectives of the assurance and regulatory arrangements often need to transcend public 
services to address wider community or public goals and objectives such as public safety 
and security rather than prioritise narrower individual organisational goals and objectives.  
These three inter-connected domains, which are illustrated in more detail in Figure 2, clearly 
have areas of overlap and some of their individual aspects or components most notably 
external audit (which is clearly a necessary and intrinsic aspect of external scrutiny) are 
common to more than one domain, in fact they are common to all three.   
 
This illustrative model is turned into an evaluative model by adopting an appropriate 
evaluative lens. In the case of local authorities this is developed from some key current 
legislative requirements on public services in England. They are not the full legislative 
requirements placed upon public services (there are clearly more specific obligations 
applicable to particular services or sectors), but collectively they provide an appropriate the 
analytical or evaluative lens for locally delivered public services. 
The first is the statutory requirement placed upon local authorities and other public bodies 
to facilitate continuous improvement across all of their services and activities, rather than 
(as previously) be subject to the local political dictates of their governing boards or 
authorities. This was first introduced in the Local Government Act 1999, which, inter alia, 
required local authorities to seek to achieve ‘Best Value’, although the obligation to achieve 
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Best Value and continuous improvement was soon extended across all significant locally 
delivered service public services. Thus, the first test or examination is whether or how far 
arrangements (or proposed changes) facilitate continuous improvement and the 
achievement of best value for the public.   
Secondly, the obligation on public services to achieve Best Value and hence value for money 
has to be assessed by a combination of the 3 ‘e’s of economy, efficiency and effectiveness. 
For a short time, under Gordon Brown’s administration, of 2007-2010, ‘equality’ and 
‘sustainability’ were added to economy, efficiency and effectiveness but subsequent 
governments since 2010 have reverted in policy and practice to the 3’e’s. 
Finally, where authorities are obliged to act collaboratively, such as when organisations 
have multiple and several organisational responsibility for tackling long-term deep-rooted 
social, economic and/or environmental issues, the obligation on all partners is to seek the 
optimal configuration of delivery arrangements that will facilitate best value and continuous 
improvement to the outcomes for the public.  
This more collective and collaborative approach to policy development and public service 
delivery (sometimes known as the ‘improvement’ agenda) was also complemented by a 
system of internal and external audit, and the measurement and monitoring of performance 
intended to ensure costs were reduced and the quality of services improved (Martin 2006, 
Goss 2007, Ashworth et al. 2010). The ‘public assurance’ regime and the regulators that 
were part of it, were also (at that time) committed to continuous improvement, mutual 
support and co-operation.  
Thus, these three objectives collectively form the evaluative lens for assessing proposed 
changes to performance regimes or parts of the regime whether they fall within the 
domains of policy development, public service delivery or public assurance.    
  
Responses to the specific questions in the review document. 
 
Chapter 1. Definitions of audit and users of the accounts 
 
Q1. Who, in your opinion, are the primary users of/main audience for local authority 
accounts?   
As the review document makes plain, at present there are multiple definitions of users, each 
capable of considerable interpretation.  
The Audit Standards definition focusses on the legislators and regulators (but does not 
exclude others), while the current CIPFA Statutory Code of LA Accounting Practice 2019-
2020, focuses on service recipients and their representatives as well as “resource providers 
and their representatives”. 
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Ultimately, the public provide the resources (through the national and local taxation 
systems, grants and fees and charges) and generally they engage with local authority service 
activities as service users, consumers, or citizens depending on the nature of local authority 
provision e.g. whether statutory, discretionary, regulatory or universal. At present, each of 
these two perspectives is both given effect and traditionally operationalised via 
‘representatives’ at national and local levels (both political and non-political), and in the 
past, elections have been the prime vehicle for citizens exerting influence in representative 
democracies.   
However, for some time citizens have demonstrated reduced participation in representative 
democracies and electoral turnouts have been falling.  In parallel, there has been increased 
pressure for improved legitimacy, accountability and transparency of government, at 
national and international levels. (Cain et al. 2003, Dalton et al. 2006).  
There has also been increasing demands for additional and direct channels of citizen 
participation in public policy making, service delivery, service configuration and 
prioritisation. Numerous countries, including the UK, have introduced various forms of 
interactive and participatory governance, at national and sub-national levels such as 
referendums, ballots, citizen’s panels and juries participatory budgeting etc. (in which 
citizens have been granted greater influence in public policy making) which have all found 
expression in the local government sector in England. [Although for example public 
consultation and participation in local plan making and in determining, planning applications 
has existed since the mid-19th century as ‘public interest’ law began to constrain private 
property law (Ashworth 1954, McAuslan 1975, 1980)].   
The public now expect participatory forms democracy to supplement representative forms 
of policy-making in an ever-wider range of public service delivery. Finally, as the review 
document makes clear, local authorities are actively collaborating with a wider range of 
stakeholders and partners in an increasing range of hybridized and complex relationships.  
Nevertheless, a common factors is that they all involve spending publicly funded time or 
money.  
 In all of these areas and relationships the public expect and have the right to expect that 
proportionate and professional internal and external audit (as well as statutory 
requirements) are ‘quality assuring’ the data and information upon which such debates and 
decision-making are based. 
Thus, it is clear that a new definition is required. It should put responsibility to the citizen at 
its core. It should incorporate the interests of three primary audiences; the public (primarily 
but not exclusively within the local administrative area), the government (in its multiple 
forms and at multiple levels) and the key stakeholders collaborating with local authorities 
(including other local authorities and public interest providers) where they are collectively 
seeking to pursue the public interest with local authorities.  
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Q2. Who are the other users of local authority accounts?  Are any of these other users of 
accounts particularly important? 
The review document gives examples of other potential users of local authority accounts 
and suggests that the numbers of such users are likely to increase.   The examples include, 
but are not limited to, existing and potential lenders, credit ratings agencies, trade unions, 
statisticians, analysts, academics and think tanks with an interest in local government. 
While these other users of accounts may be important, their interests are generally not 
synonymous, identical or coterminous with the public interest, and they also have particular 
interests that may or may not be the same as the public interest at any one time.  The 
interest of existing and potential lenders, credit ratings agencies, trade unions, and think 
tanks are clearly partial while ‘statisticians, analysts and academics’ arefar  too broad and 
amorphous as groups to identify as having a particular interest.     
 
Q3. What level of financial literacy/familiarity with accounts and audit is it reasonable to 
expect the primary users of accounts to have and what implications does this have for the 
information presented in accounts and/or the information that should be subject to 
external audit?  
According to Standard & Poor’s rating services (Klapper et al. 2019), the countries with the 
highest financial literacy rates are Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Israel, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, where about 65 percent or more of 
adults are financially literate.Iinformation produced in local authority financial statements 
must meet the accountability and/or decision-making needs of users and be sufficiently 
transparent and understandable to be interpretable by a reasonably well-informed person. 
Despite this level of financial literacy, and the requirement place on the producers, local 
authority accounts in the UK (and their budgeting and financial processes) have become 
more complex and are not as transparent to the general public as they should be and in 
effect have to be translated and interpreted by professional public service accountants and 
financial analysts. 
While this interpretation and advice may be available to government and some public 
representatives, the general consensus is there is far too small a number of people who 
understand the financial provisions and the budgetary arrangements of local authorities 
(Murphy 2019b) and in particular its presentation in their annual accounts.   
High quality, proportionate public audit is essential (although not of itself sufficient) for 
developing high quality public services and holding authorities to account. The current 
presentation and opinions on the accounts are demonstrably unfit for purpose – as the 
review document implicitly acknowledges. They need to be much more transparent with 
‘plain English’ commentaries. 
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Q4. Does the external audit process cover the right things given the interests of the 
primary users of the accounts/is the scope of the opinions wide enough?  
The external audit process should cover the short, medium and long-term use of the public 
resources used by the authority, rather than being focused on annual financial reporting.  
It should retain a Value for Money opinion on the adequacy of systems in place to support 
the economy, effectiveness and efficiency in its use of resources, but (in line with the above 
view) this should be extended to provide an opinion on the sustainability of the financial 
strategy performance and arrangements of the authority. This should in turn inform an 
assessment of an authority’s financial resilience which should replace the ‘going concern’ 
test and report. 
 
Q5. Is the going concern opinion meaningful when assessing local authority resilience? If 
not, what should replace it? 
The ‘going concern’ test and report is (as the review document makes plain) meaningless 
and should be expunged from requirements. In reality, it gives the public a misconception or 
misleading impression of ‘financial security’. Its’ preparation therefore wastes public money 
and its’ inadequacies potentially undermines public, professional and elected member 
confidence in other parts of the external audit. It should be replaced with a robust 
assessment of the financial resilience of local authorities, following appropriate 
consideration of national and international good practice (see Steccolini et al 2017).  
 
Chapter 2: The Expectation Gap 
 
In chapter 2 the review document gives multiple examples of the audit expectations that are 
not matched (or not fully matched) by the corresponding statutory and regulatory 
framework. Similarly, it states that where a local authority suffers financial or service failure, 
this is the responsibility of elected representatives and statutory officers.  
The latter is true and is also how it should be – although in the authors view they should be 
informed by more appropriate auditors opinions than is currently the case (as suggested 
above in response to chapter 1), and greater assurance as to the robustness of the data and 
information upon which these current opinions are based. 
The examples given are 
• An expectation that the audit will provide an opinion on the value for money of 
service delivery; 
• An expectation that the audit will provide assurance over the effectiveness of service 
delivery; 
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• An expectation that the audit will provide assurance over the financial resilience of 
the authority; 
• An expectation that the auditor will have actively sought out any evidence of fraud; 
• An expectation that the auditor will have confirmed that specific grant income has 
been spent solely on the purposes for which it was intended; and 
• An expectation that the audit opinion covers all of the financial and non-financial 
information included in the annual report and accounts. 
The review document suggest that the gaps can be categorized into  
a. Knowledge gap – do users of accounts understand what the statutory framework 
requires auditors of local authorities to do? 
b. Evolution gap - is there a difference between what users of accounts expect auditors to 
do and what they are responsible for doing? 
c. Quality gap – do external auditors do the things that they are supposed to do to with 
and appropriate degree of knowledge, skill and rigour? 
This helpful categorization assists our knowledge and understanding.  However, these 
expectation gaps are also collective ‘systemic gaps’ across the whole policy, delivery and 
assurance arrangements of local authorities rather than public audit gaps per see.  
They result from inadequacies or omissions in the performance management regime as a 
whole rather than specifically and/or exclusively from external audit. The expectations 
identified above, arise partly because other public performance regimes either in other 
sectors, in other public services or in other jurisdictions or in previous periods in the UK, 
that have been able to meet these expectations (partially or fully) or have claimed to do so.    
Figures 1 and 2 above show how the context, the parameters, the agencies and the 
interrelationships operating within the public assurance domain of public services includes 
appropriate internal and external scrutiny, and pages 4 and 5 above show how this can be 
operationalised and the system evaluated for local authorities in the English context.   
Omissions and inadequacies in the performance management regime should be rectified, 
but this review is focussed on local authority financial reporting and external audit. Only 
‘gaps’ most appropriately addressed in the financial reporting and external audit 
arrangements of local authorities should be addressed in the financial reporting and 
external audit arrangements of local authorities  
Q6. In your audit opinion, what should an external audit of a set of local authority 
financial statements cover?  
The performance regime and the public assurance arrangements covering local authorities 
should in my opinion collectively meet all of these expectations; however, the external audit 
itself should cover 
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• a ‘Value for Money’ opinion which should continue to be based on the adequacy of 
systems in place to support the economy, effectiveness and efficiency of an 
authorities use of resources. This should be extended to provide an opinion on the 
sustainability of the financial strategy, and the arrangements the authority is making 
to ensure financial sustainability/resilience. 
• Appropriate assurance that the internal and external audits have actively sought out 
any evidence of fraud and that the audit opinion covers all of the financial and non-
financial information included in the annual report and accounts 
• That internal and external audit have actively sought to assure the quality of data 
and information used to underpin the assurances above.   
I recognise that the question relates to ‘local authority financial statements’ and my 
response is broader in its’ scope, covering both use of resources and by implication non-
financial resources and non-financial information.    
 
Q7. In your opinion, what should the scope of the external auditor’s value for money 
opinion be? 
This is covered in the response to questions 4, 5 and 6 above.  
 
Q8. What is your view on the scope of an external audit engagement as described in 
Chapters 1 and 2 of this Call for Views? If it is different from your expectations, does this 
have implications for the reliance you place on external audit work? 
External audit arrangements are currently narrower in scope than they should be (and have 
been in the past) and the external engagement of external auditors with the policy, delivery 
and assurance of local authorities and their partners has declined significantly in the post-
2010 sector-led improvement regime in local authorities.  
Previously the need for and expectation of, continuous improvement based on improving 
evidence based policy and delivery was paramount and demonstrable in England. Since 
2010, this has been replaced by a national policy of short-term cutback management, which 
is inherently less economic, efficient or effective than a more strategic approach. It has been 
based upon a deteriorating and poorer evidence base and less sophisticated interrogatory 
and inspection regimes (Ferry and Murphy 2015, Murphy et al. 2019). The reliance that can 
be placed on robust external audit work has therefore inevitably deteriorated as has the 
external auditors practice (Walker 2019).   
       
Q9. Should the external audit engagement be extended? If so, which additional 
areas/matters are most important for external auditors to look at? What would be the 
cost implications of extending the engagement to the areas/matters you consider to be 
most important be? 
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External (and internal) audit should be applied to all public expenditure (capital, revenue 
and grant aid) that flows through local authorities or their collaborative partners. It should 
be applied proportionately but comprehensively to all arms-length delivery companies, 
agencies, partnerships, collaborative and outsourced services, joint ventures and special 
delivery vehicles.  
The matters to be looked at are outlined in response to question 6 above.  
In addition, Michael Bichard (2012) has identified the need for audit to encourage 
integration and preventative services and to critically evaluate public policy – or at least 
auditing the process of policy making while not falling foul of undermining the democratic 
right of politicians to make political choices.  
The overall ‘cost envelope’ of arrangements for public assurance can be managed to 
minimise the cost implications of these changes.   
 
Chapter 3: Audit and Wider Assurance 
 
Q10. Should the scope of the vfm opinion be expanded to explicitly require assessment of 
the systems in place to support the preparation of some or all of the reports that statute 
requires to be presented to full Council?  If you do, which reports should be within scope 
of the external audit vfm engagement? If not, should these be assessed through another 
form of external engagement? If you believe that the vfm opinion should be extended to 
cover these reports will there be implications for the timing of audit work or auditor 
reporting? 
There should be a more comprehensive and robust performance management regime in 
place for local authorities that includes robust external audit and with external audit and 
external audit value for money engagement strategical deployed within the overall 
assurance landscape. It is noted that statutory interventions relating to financial distress, 
service failure and/or other inability to meet statutory duties have generally been 
discovered by assurance arrangements other than the MHCLG Accounting Officer’s System 
Statement for Local Government. Failures in Birmingham, Rotherham, Rochdale, 
Nottinghamshire, Northamptonshire, and Essex FRS (among many others) have generally 
been unearthed by service inspectorates and other assurance agencies. Government has 
generally continued to focus on incidents, events and specific failures rather than exposing 
and dealing with underlying causes. Recent intervention reports, including those referred to 
above, indicate that serious issues in service are coming to light later than in previous era’s 
and hence are more difficult and costly to address. 
Extending external audit vfm opinion does have a role, and auditors should acknowledge 
issues of concern in their reports, but a more fundamental approach to improving assurance 
is required.  
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Q11. Should external auditors be required to engage with Inspectorates looking at aspects 
of a local authority’s service delivery?  If you believe that this engagement should happen, 
how frequent should such engagement be and what would be the end purpose of doing 
so? 
External Auditors should be required to engage within the inspectorates looking at aspects 
of a local authority’s service delivery.  
This was routinely done in the past where external auditors (and inspectors from the Audit 
Commission, and other inspectorates) were effectively part of improvement and 
intervention arrangements were these were deemed appropriate.  
Such engagement should obviously be proportionate to the performance of the local 
authorities and the importance of the issue. The end purpose would be financial and non-
financial improvement in performance and more economic, efficient and effective delivery 
of public services, assurance to the public and cost to the public purse.  
  
Additional Comment on Chapter 3. 
Chapter 3, paragraph 7 refers to the transparency code and the (arbitrary) £500 expenditure 
limit. This has generated large increases in freedom of information (FoI) requests mostly 
from the media and from vested political interests. An increasingly large proportion of FoI 
requests are simply vexatious and/or publicity seeking and add no value to either improving 
services or public assurance. The arrangements have been counter-productive and in terms 
of the original intentions it has resulted in a ‘perverse’ outcome. Despite anticipated 
political opposition (probably from all parties) it should be removed.      
 
Chapter 4: The Governance Framework for the Audit System 
 
Q12. Does the current procurement process for local authority audit drive the right 
balance between cost reduction, quality of work, volume of external audit hours and mix 
of staff undertaking audit engagements? 
This is an area where the author has only indirect experience since the current system was 
established after 2010 and I have undertaken no primary research of the new 
arrangements. 
Anecdotal evidence from in-service audit, accounting and management students, and from 
new (audit) teaching staff joining the business school consistently suggests cost reduction, 
promotion of ‘non-audit’ company services and reductions in the skill mix of staff 
undertaking audit engagements have been the predominant drivers rather than improving 
the quality of work supporting improvement and good practice. This would support rather 
than conflict with the concerns of Sir John the Kingman’s Review. Emerging research from 
Helen Walker (2019) at Northumbria University corroborates this view.    
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Q13. How should regulators ensure that audit firms and responsible individuals have the 
skills, experience and knowledge to deliver high quality financial and vfm audits, whilst 
ensuring the barriers to entry do not get too high?  
The new organisation recommended by the Kingman Review should work with the 
professional auditing bodies to set the relevant standards, inspect the quality of relevant 
audit work and oversee the relevant professional bodies. This would include ensuring audit 
firms and responsible individuals have the skills, experience and knowledge to deliver high 
quality financial and vfm audits, whilst ensuring the barriers to entry do not get too high. It 
should also take on responsibility for appointing auditors for local bodies and agreeing fees. 
 
Q14. What metrics should regulators use when assessing whether financial and vfm audits 
are delivered to an appropriate level of quality? 
Whilst not defining thespecifics of the metric - these should be objectively based, 
transparent and agreed following an appropriate public consultation exercise that meets the 
Gunning/Sedley principles.  
 
Q15. Do you agree with the Independent Review of the Financial Reporting Council’s 
findings and recommendations; and why do you agree/not agree?  If you agree with the 
recommendations do you think the ‘single regulatory body’ should be the “successor body 
to the FRC” or a sector specific entity? If you do not agree with the recommendations are 
there any other changes you would make to the regulatory framework for local authority 
audit? 
I agree that arrangements for local audit need to be reconsidered, because I acknowledge 
that weak and weakening arrangements, if allowed to persist, run a very clear risk of 
allowing weak and limited audit disciplines to prevail in local government. This is of 
particular concern given the vital role played by district auditors in detecting and seeking 
out corruption. This is also important at a time when local authorities are under financial 
pressure, and some local authorities are engaging in risky speculative ventures.  
The author was asked to comment on  some of these ventures in a recent House of 
Commons (MHCLG) select committee hearing relating to local government finance and the 
spending review 2019 (Murphy 2019b). The author has been an adviser to the Centre for 
Public Scrutiny for a number of years and concurs with the Kingman review that “high-
quality and robust scrutiny of local authorities’ finances and financial management in the 
public interest is a critical part of local democracy”. The Centre for Public Scrutiny provides 
an annual assessment of the scrutiny capacity of local authorities. This demonstrates 
significant and continuous reductions in the level of resources devoted to scrutiny over the 
last eight years (Centre for Public Scrutiny 2019).    
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In general, I agree with the Independent Review of the Financial Reporting Council’s findings 
and recommendations. I consider the ‘single regulatory body’ could be part of the 
“successor body to the FRC” but would be better as a sector specific body enabling it to 
develop a deeper understanding and expertise in local audit. 
 
Chapter 5: Audit Product and Quality 
 
Q16. Do external audit firms have enough understanding of the local authority regulatory 
framework to focus audit work on the right areas? How do they/should they demonstrate 
this?  Who should regulate this work?  
Apologies I do not have sufficient knowledgeable or recent experience to comment in detail 
about these issues but these appear to be matters for the new organisation recommended 
by the Kingman Review.  
 
Q17. Do auditing standards have a positive impact on the quality of local authority 
financial audits? 
I agree with the NAO and the Public Accounts Select Committee reports on Local 
government governance and accountability (NAO 2019, House of Commons 2019) and their 
concerns about audit coverage and quality. The current arrangements are too restrictive in 
terms of reporting options and have perceived or potential disincentives and inefficiencies 
built into the arrangements as the sector specific example of auditing to complete the 
auditing file suggests.  
Whether they currently have a positive or negative impact – it is clear from the various 
views that they could (and should) be improved and need to be designed more 
appropriately for the local authority auditing environment.   
 
Q18. Do audit firms allocate sufficient resources to deliver high quality and timely audits? 
How is consistency and quality maintained in external audit work?  To what extent is 
there consistency in audit teams year on year?  What more can be done to ensure 
consistency between firms?  
Apologies I do not have sufficient knowledgeable or recent experience to comment usefully 
about these issues.  
 
Q19. To what extent are senior audit staff, particularly the responsible individual signing 
the audit certificate, visibly involved in audit work?  Who do senior audit staff meet with?    
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Apologies I do not have sufficient knowledgeable or recent experience to comment usefully 
about these issues.  
 
Q20. Should external auditors consider financial resilience as a key factor when designing 
their vfm work programme? If so, what factors do they/should they consider as indicative 
of a lack of financial resilience? 
As is clear from answers above that I do take the view that external auditors should consider 
financial resilience, both for the audit and as part of the wider performance management 
and public assurance arrangements of local authorities. It is clear that this is a new area that 
needs development. This evidence has referred above to a recent early comparative study 
of the issue in 11 countries including the UK (Steccolini et al. 2017). 
The concept of financial resilience is particularly useful in understanding how local 
authorities respond to adverse conditions affecting their financial position (Barbera et al 
2017). One of these strategic capacities, ‘perceived financial vulnerability’ is the degree to 
which organisations are exposed to specific shocks or crisis (Saliterer et al. 2017). 
Saliterer et al. (2017) define financial resilience as the ability of organisations to anticipate, 
absorb, and respond to financial shock arising from a dynamic combination of four 
interrelated phenomena, which include, (1) financial vulnerability, (2) shocks, (3) absorbitive 
and anticipatory capacity, and (4) coping capacities. 
In terms of the factors they might consider as indicative of financial stress or a lack of 
financial resilience it would be wise to look at lessons from recent and previous government 
intervention cases, where resources were a key issue and some wider lessons from past 
crises such as the Icelandic bank crises in 2008.  
In the recent Northamptonshire County Council case, it was clear the level and deterioration 
of reserves allied to long-term weakness in elected member and officer capacity and 
capability in financial management was a key factor. 
In other interventions (particularly small district councils) large outsourcing or major capital 
contracts (relative to their overall budgets) were an indicator of potential weakness – as 
were authorities failing to manage in-house delivery implementing rapid outsourcing as a 
panacea for their problems.    
 
Q21. Does the Code of Audit Practice provide enough guidance on how much work needs 
to be done to support the vfm opinion? If not, what should it cover?  
Apologies I do not have sufficient knowledgeable or sufficient recent detailed experience to 
comment usefully about these issues.  
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Q22. Do auditing standards provide appropriate guidance on quality standards for vfm 
audits? If not, is guidance needed and should it be included in the Code of Audit Practice 
or elsewhere?  
Apologies I do not have sufficient knowledgeable or sufficient recent detailed experience to 
comment usefully about these issues.  
 
Q23.  What is the current relationship between external and internal audit? How should 
that relationship be developed to add most value to local authorities and local residents?  
The relationship between the two functions have become more remote and detached in 
recent years, both structurally and as a professional relationship. 
The respective roles should be clearly defined and differentiated but they should be 
designed to be mutually supportive of their common objective of improving public and 
organisational assurance.  Internal and external auditors should be mutually respectful of 
each others roles and develop a robust professional and working relationship.   
 
Q24. What should happen when a regulator finds that a local authority audit has not met 
quality standards? Where should the balance between ensuring effective enforcement 
action against auditors and maintaining participants in the audit market lie? 
I suspect this will be a matter for the new organisation recommended by the Kingman 
Review. Any individual case will revolve around how poor the audit is but without doubt, 
ensuring effective enforcement action against auditors is the primary consideration above 
maintaining providers of audit.  
 
Chapter 6: Auditor Reporting 
 
Q25. Do you think that the format of the vfm audit opinion provides useful information? If 
not what would you like it to cover? 
The vfm opinion does contain useful information but it could be improved by including an 
auditors’ assessment about whether arrangements are likely to remain in place going 
forward and an opinion as to whether value for money outcomes have been achieved.  
In the past the forward look (sometimes referred to as prospective accountability) and the 
achievement of outcomes was assessed and provided as part of the Audit Commission 
external assessment and audit regime. My colleagues and I have consistently argued that 
public service accountability, transparency and assurance requires an appropriate balance 
between prospective and retrospective perspectives as well as a more dialogic approach to 
accountability (Murphy et al. 2019).  
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There should also be a greater range of audit opinion options for auditors to deploy and 
preferably a short series of opinions together an overall opinion to give auditors the 
flexibility they need in the ever more complex auditing environment of local authorities.  
 
Q26.Do you think the vfm opinion should be qualified solely because a local authority has 
received an inadequate Ofsted opinion or a similar opinion from another inspectorate?  
Not necessarily but there will be occasions where it is justified.  
Similarly, some inspectorates/inspections are much smaller in scope and importance than 
Ofsted inspections. Tackling this with a series of opinions and an overall opinion might be a 
practical way forward worthy of further investigation.  
 
Q27. Do you think that the vfm opinion is presented at the right point in a local authority’s 
annual financial management and budgeting cycle? If not when do you think it would be 
most useful?  
 The most useful time would be before the annual budget making cycle starts. This is 
realistically around early September. 
 
Q28. Where auditors have identified significant issues, audit certificates and reports have 
often been delayed? Why do you think this is and can changes be made to the framework 
to encourage earlier reporting of significant issues?  
Apologies I do not have sufficient knowledgeable or sufficient recent detailed experience to 
comment usefully about these issues.  
 
Q29. In your view, what sorts of issues should Public Interest Reports be used to highlight?   
The last time a significant number of Public Interest Reports were published was at the time 
of Corporate Governance Reports immediately before or around the time of the first two 
cohorts of Comprehensive Performance Assessments (the first ‘Single Tier and County 
Council’ cohort and first District Council cohort. Prior to this, it was Labour councils in the 
1980s (the 1984/85 audit prompted 54 PIRs and 1985/86 resulted in 89) and Westminster 
Council (under Dame Shirley Porter) and later Hackney and Lambeth London Boroughs. In all 
these cases, they indicated misuse of power and public funds by individuals – both officers 
and members (see Campbell-Smith 2008). 
Although they were not formally part of the CPA arrangements,  PIRs appeared to have 
become an assumed part of the regime and hence to have been superseded by the broad 
intervention powers that were introduced as part of CPA. Two of the district council 
intervention cases that I was ‘Lead Official for (NE Derbyshire DC and Erewash BC) could not 
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have been resolved as effectively without the information in the PIR that was made 
available at the time of the Corporate Governance Inspection  
 
Q30. Statistics demonstrate that very few Public Interest Reports and Statutory 
Recommendations have been issued.  Why do you think this is? Does it indicate an issue 
with the framework or common behaviours? If you think this is an issue, what can be 
done to incentivise more frequent and timely reporting of significant issues?  
Although PIRs were not formally part of the CPA arrangements, they seem to have been 
assumed to be part of the regime and to have been superseded by the broad intervention 
powers that were introduced as part of CPA. There were more limited service intervention 
powers prior to CPA but these were only available to a few local government services such 
as education and the benefits service.  The intervention powers are still the basis for most 
central government interventions and under the labour administrations they were extended 
to all Best Value Authorities including NHS Primary Care Trusts and Fire and Rescue Services.      
PIRs and Statutory recommendations were very useful parts of the public assurance and 
financial probity investigation portfolio. I suspect their active use has declined more because 
of lack of awareness among the public and the auditors (particularly since District Audit was 
abolished) rather than improved behaviours and/or elimination of the type of issues they 
dealt with! 
 
Q31. Does a publication summarising the results of local authority audits add value?  If so 
who should publish it and what information would they need to have access to perform 
this function effectively? 
Since 1983 and the establishment of the Audit Commission and the publication of statistics 
for all local authorities, police and fire services; performance management and monitoring 
and public audit (to be effective), has relied on robust comparative information and data 
being available, accessible and in the public domain. It also needs to be brought together in 
a single repository with high quality interrogatory tools and techniques freely available to all 
enquirers, although this repository needs to be backed up and replicated. 
The loss of the vast majority of the Audit Commission database (individual reports on 
individual inspections – as opposed to AC national reports) when the commission was closed 
and the web-based information was transferred to the National Archives shows how 
vulnerable these databases in a single location are.  
Such repositories need to have an independent host organisation that commands the sector 
wide confidence of the community of interest. They also need to be backed up securely in 
another public organisation.  
   
Chapter 7: The Framework for Responding to Audit Findings 
21 
 
 
Q32. To whom should external auditors present audit reports and findings; is it the audit 
committee, to full council or equivalent or another committee?  If findings are not 
presented to full council or equivalent what information (if any) should full council or 
equivalent receive?  
There are arguments to support and arguments to challenge the particular arrangements in 
the PCC/Chief Constable model; the Mayoral Combined Authority model or the model in 
NHS Health Trust. What is common to all of these models is a degree of independent 
scrutiny and regularised, timely and assured reporting that is absent from the local authority 
arrangements. There is unwarranted variation even between different local authorities .  
There must be a (compulsory) significant independent element within new arrangements; a 
proscribed timetable and ultimately reporting to Full Council through a dedicated and 
independently chaired Audit Committee.   
    
Q33. In your authority, what is the membership of the audit committee (number of 
members, how many are independent etc) and which officers typically attend? 
Not applicable as author no longer working in a council. 
  
Q34. How should local authorities track implementation of recommendations made by 
internal audit, external audit and relevant statutory inspectorates? What should the 
external auditors do if recommendations are not being implemented?  
This is a matter for their internal scrutiny arrangements, which is particularly unfortunate 
given the continuing erosion of power and resources available or applied to the scrutiny 
function within local authorities over the last eight years. This is compounded, by the 
significant inadequacies and deterioration in efficacy of the performance management and 
monitoring regime for local authorities and external their scrutiny arrangements. 
The internal performance management committees, boards and project teams that 
proliferated in local authorities only 10 years ago, have almost totally disappeared and 
those that remain have significantly reduced influence. 
 There is obviously an issue about proportionality and a clear difference between statutory 
and non-statutory auditor recommendations; but in the first instance, auditors should 
expedite reporting them to the authority to make the authority aware and able to take 
immediater corrective action or provide an explanation.   
 
Q35. Should there be a role for an external body in tracking action taken in response to 
modified audit opinions and/or statutory recommendations and public interest reports? If 
so should that responsibility sit with MHCLG, the sector specific oversight body 
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recommended by the Independent Review of the Financial Reporting Council or another 
body? 
In the absence of Local Strategic Partnerships and the Government Offices for the Regions 
either of which might have been appropriate bodies (duly enfranchised), or Regional LGAs 
or Regional Assemblies (less appropriate in my view); the  Centre for Public Scrutiny 
proposals for Local Public Accounts Committee should be revisited together with the sector 
specific oversight body recommended by the Independent Review of the Financial Reporting 
Council.  
If the responsibility was to sit with MHCLG it should be on the basis of an arms-length Non-
Departmental Public Body, but I would not favour this option as it would inevitably lead to 
micro management from the central state and is likely to be strongly resisted by local 
authorities and any collaborative partners who’s actions are implicated. 
  
Chapter 8: The Financial Reporting Framework 
 
Q36.  Do local authority accounts allow the user to understand an authority’s financial 
performance and its financial resilience? If not, how could they be revised to be more 
understandable?  What information could be presented to enable users of the accounts to 
understand whether the financial position of a specific LA is getting better or worse? 
It should be clear from earlier answers that I do not consider current local authority 
accounts are either appropriately structured or are sufficiently transparent to allow the 
users to understand an authority’s financial performance nor its financial resilience. I do not 
think this is the case for users who have professional advice available (such as the 
government and elected members of the authority) let alone a “reasonably well-informed” 
individual member of the public. 
Prospective and retrospective accountability needs to be embraced and designed-into the 
new arrangements. The assessment of financial resilience should be developed and 
incorporated into the regime. The latter will require co-creation, co-production and testing 
of new mechanisms and tools and although it will take time, it is essential to meet current 
(and future) public expectations.   
 
Q37.  The UK Government is committed to maintaining IFRS based accounting for the UK 
public sector.  Given this, how would you recommend resolving the mismatch between 
the accruals and funding basis to improve the understandability of local authority 
accounts?  
Apologies I do not have sufficient technical knowledge or sufficient recent detailed 
experience to comment usefully about these issues.  
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Q38.  Do you think that summary financial information should be reported in the annual 
report section of the accounts? If so, on what basis and should this information be 
covered by the financial audit opinion?  
Yes, and it should be subject to the test of being a fair reflection of the accounts (‘not 
inconsistent’ is a lower test than ‘fair reflection’).  
Any such prominent and important information (if included) should be subject to audit.  
 
Q39.  If you think that summary financial information should be reported in the annual 
report section of the accounts, should it be presented with performance information? If 
so, what performance information would be of most interest to stakeholders? 
Vfm, financial resilience, organisational sustainability and auditors’ opinions on financial and 
non-financial performance are the aspects of most interest to stakeholders. Non-financial 
performance should be publicly reported but not in the financial accounts. Subject to the 
development of appropriate technical tools and measures – the others should be. 
 
Chapter 9: Other Issues 
 
Q40. For larger authorities, does the inspection and objection regime allow local residents 
to hold their council to account in an effective manner? If not, how should the regime be 
modified?  
Apologies I do not have sufficient recent detailed experience to comment usefully about 
these issues. 
 
Q41. Is more guidance needed to help auditors assess the impact of significant changes to 
common business models? If so is this guidance needed to support the financial audit, the 
vfm audit or both?  
Given the fundamental shift in the numbers, scope and complexity of these new models and 
the significant risks they represent to value for money and the financial resilience of local 
authorities, there is a clear and compelling need for new up-to-date guidance that is 
comprehensive in terms of all public expenditure by local authorities. 
For the avoidance of any doubt the above view (about the need to comprehensively audit all 
public expenditure) applies to all expenditure – whether direct expenditure, public-public, 
public-private and commercial expenditure (and in particular commercial expenditure).   
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Q42. Is the financial reporting and audit framework for larger category 2 authorities 
appropriate? If not, what additional information should be subject to audit/assurance and 
what would be the cost implications of this?  
There have always been a small number of large Parish and Town Councils with significant 
assets and revenues e.g. Dronfield TC in Derbyshire and Burbage PC and Melton TC in 
Leicestershire, and these are going to get larger (see Sandford 2019, for current issues).  
The National Association Local Councils (NALC 2019) which is the representative body for 
Parish and Town councils has suggested that there are some 270 more parish and town 
councils in England than there were just over 15 years ago. Both the Coalition Government 
and previous Labour administrations encouraged both their establishment and the 
devolution of powers and assets to this level of administration. The continuing 
reorganisation of local authorities into unitary authorities has also been a significant factor 
in their growth. 
Whatever the reasons for this growth they should not be exempt from financial 
accountability to the public. Simply revising the current £200k and £6.5m limits is merely 
postponing the issue (although these limits do also need revisiting). However, the current 
non-simplified accruals Annual Governance and Accounts return arrangements and the no–
income exemption statement appear to be sufficient for the smaller Category 2 councils.  
A full audit would appear disproportionate for larger Category 2 authorities but they should 
be subject to a level of review greater than a limited assurance engagement. The current 
review has the opportunity to recommend the establishment of an appropriate working 
group (with key stakeholders such as CIPFA, and NALC included) to devise and recommend a 
new intermediate regime for larger category 2 authorities. If sufficient support is 
forthcoming from the current ‘call for views’ I would recommend it does so.   
 
Q43. For smaller authorities, does the inspection and objection regime allow local 
residents to hold their council to account in an effective manner and is the cost of 
processing and responding to objections proportionate? If not, how should the regime be 
modified? 
Although I have not faced this issue in practice for some years, in my previous experience, 
there were multiple objections on Parish/Town Council accounts from the same individuals 
and groups (often members of the same Parish/Town Council).  
Automatic audits with fees is clearly disproportionate and wastes public money particularly 
as the opportunity is there to formally involve both the local Monitoring Officer, the Section 
151 Officer and/or the internal audit officers of the principle local authority as part of an 
initial review before invoking a full audit.   
This issue should be part of the remit of the working group referred to in the response to 
Question 42.   
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